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Charlotte Waelde
The camera – a term first used by the scientist Sir John F.W. Herschel in 1839 - has 
come a long way since the summer of 1827 when it took Joseph Nicéphore Niépce eight 
hours to obtain a fixed image.  It would take a further 12 years for Louis Jacques Mandé 
Daguerre to reduce the exposure time to less than thirty minutes and to keep the image 
from disappearing, ushering in the age of photography. Advancements in the technology 
since those first tentative steps were taken have resulted in increasingly sophisticated 
means by which images may be captured and thereafter manipulated.  In tandem, a whole 
host of issues have emerged, from legal questions over ownership of the images to 
ethical and moral arguments concerning subsequent manipulation.
This paper considers two areas both of which concern the subject and the power that 
subject has over the image.  The first is the extent to which control can be exerted over 
exploitation, and the second is the extent to which control can extend to digital 
manipulation.  Both may be considered under the much broader head of personality 
rights.
Personality rights in the UK
Unlike many other jurisdictions, historically the law in the UK has not interfered to 
prevent the exploitation of the image (or other attributes) of an individual, whether that 
individual be a dead icon (Marilyn Monroe), a live celebrity (Posh Spice), or a living 
individual largely unrecognised by the wider community (Me).  The laws that have been 
argued and rejected tend to be the existing intellectual property rights and related laws, 
notably copyright and performers rights, trade marks and passing off and breach of 
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confidence.  The arguments are often raised in  relation to two types of use: commercial 
exploitation and freedom of expression.
Commercial exploitation
Personality and Property
When categorising the use of an image, often the question arises as to whether the use is 
commercial or non-commercial.  In many jurisdictions courts are more sympathetic in 
allowing the subject to prevent commercial exploitation by others rather than non-
commercial use which itself tends to bring its own questions of freedom of expression.  
However, this raises the question:  what is meant by commercial exploitation given that 
almost any use can have some commercial connotations?  Use for advertising purposes, 
on mugs and T-shirts are some obvious examples.  But also falling under this head could 
be a wide variety of other artistic purposes, such as the use of images of Marilyn Monroe 
by Andy Warhol,  as well as the use of images in newspapers and magazines such as 
those of Sharbat Gula, the Afghan girl with green eyes, which no doubt increased the 
sales of the National Geographic magazine1.  Certainly in the UK, conflicts between the 
subject of an image and the use of that image in newspapers, magazines and other 
sections of the media has tended to be categorised in terms of freedom of expression 
rather than commercial exploitation.  
In the US, where the right of publicity has long been recognised and which is to be 
found in the statutes of a number of states, has recently been called a ‘mess2’.  
Commercial exploitation tends to be the preserve of the subject of the image, but that 
control has been extending into areas that may more properly be described as non-
commercial.  To try and form a framework, one American commentator has suggested 
that commercial use should be dictated by the nature of the article in connection with 
which the image is used.  Where an image is used in connection with an article which 
serves primarily some intrinsic utilitarian function distinct from conveying information, 
then use of the image is commercial.  This, it is argued,  would mean that traditional 
media objects such as books, magazines and newspapers would not be actionable3.  Such 
distinctions seem to raise more questions than answers.  What about T-shirts which can 
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both communicate messages and be worn?  Or decorative mugs and plates used merely 
to adorn a sideboard?  Or trade magazines which serve no function other than to carry 
advertisements for retailers?
This notion of commercial use has not, to date, much troubled the courts in the UK.  
However, the law has recently developed to enable an individual to enjoin use of an 
image for the purposes of advertising – a commercial application.  This occurred under 
the law of passing-off.  Previously this area of the law had little to say in relation to 
control over the use of images.  Thus in  Lyngstrad v Annabas Products4 the pop group 
ABBA could not obtain relief against traders selling paraphernalia that bore the name 
and image of the group.  The defendants were not doing ‘anything more than catering for a 
popular demand among teenagers for effigies of their idols’.  Similarly in Halliwell v Panini SpA5  the 
Spice Girls could not prevent  sale of stickers because traders who supplied them were 
responding to the demand for ‘effigies and quotes of today’s idols’6.  However, the recent case 
of Irvine v Talksport Ltd. 7 Mr Eddie Irvine, a racing car driver for Ferrari, was able to 
prevent a radio station called Talk Sport Radio from using an image they had obtained 
from a commercial agency for the purposes of endorsing their service.  In defining 
endorsement, the court said: ‘When someone endorses a product or service he tells the relevant public 
that he approves of the product or service or is happy to be associated with it’.  This differs from 
merchandising which involves exploiting images themes or articles but does not 
necessarily entail a message to the public that the products are endorsed by the celebrity. 
However, there are limits on who can bring an action for false endorsement.  Firstly, 
anyone contemplating such a move must, at the time of the acts complained of have a 
significant reputation or goodwill, and secondly the false message must be given that a 
not insignificant section of his market that his goods have been endorsed, recommended 
or are approved of by the claimant8.  The judgement seems to be in line with common 
sense.  It seems right that an individual should be able to prevent such false messages 
from being spread.  However, it should be noted that parameters were placed on this 
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development by the court.  First, it extends only to live celebrities.  On Elvis Presley the 
court said that ‘there could be no question of the performer endorsing anything since he had been dead 
for many years9.’  Secondly, the individual must, at the time of the acts complained of, have 
a significant reputation.  So looking to the individuals in the title to this paper, the estate 
of Marilyn Monroe would have no claim, and neither would I as I have no goodwill to 
protect10.  Posh Spice on the other hand may well be able to bring a successful action.  
That in turn begs the question as to what amounts to endorsement.  In the instant case 
the picture of Eddy Irvine had been altered to make it look as if he was holding a radio.  
But what if a picture of Posh Spice were used on a T shirt with the name of the 
manufacturer also visible?  Would that also amount to endorsement?  Or a picture of her 
used in connection with an article on children’s clothes in a magazine carrying 
advertisements for clothes?  Where endorsement begins and ends and how it is to be 
distinguished from merchandising is not at all clear but perhaps an easier test to apply 
than looking to the function of the article to which the image is applied.
Freedom of Expression
Personality and Privacy
Arguments in relation to freedom of expression competing with the desire of the subject 
to control the use of an image has not historically troubled UK law to any great extent11.  
In an early case, Pollard v Photographic Company a photographer took a photograph of Mrs 
Pollard and then without her permission used the image on Christmas cards and sold 
those to the public.  The court found for Mrs Pollard, but based on the law of breach of 
confidence: ‘the photographer who uses to negative to produce other copies for his own use, without 
authority, is abusing the power confidentially placed in his hands’.  In a similar vein in Creation 
Records v News Group Newspapers12 a photographer who took pictures of a scene which had 
been put together for the purposes of producing an image for the cover of a pop album 
was found to have taken that photograph in breach of confidence.  This was particularly 
so since there were security measures at the scene to prevent unauthorised photography 
and the photograph was taken in a surreptitious manner13.  
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However, this is now changing.  The developing jurisprudence under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and its interaction with freedom of expression is starting to prove most 
interesting for the control a subject has over the use of an image.  A tension arises in the 
1998 Act because of competing values, that of freedom of expression14 and that of the 
right to respect for a private and family life15.  Given that the UK courts are now charged 
with interpreting legislation in a way that is compatible with the Convention16, and that 
courts, as public authorities, are required not to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right17 it is unsurprising that it has fallen to the courts to find some path 
between these values.
They have largely responded by developing the law of breach of confidence.18  One of 
the more recent cases, Theakston v MGN Limited 19concerned the visit by Mr Theakston to 
a brothel and the subsequent sale by the prostitute concerned of that information and 
photographs to the newspaper (Sunday People).  The court refused to enjoin publication 
of the text as particular regard should be had to the freedom of expression of the Sunday 
People and of the prostitute20.  However, as regards the photographs, the court found 
that it was likely that an injunction would be obtained against publication of these.   It 
was recognised that photographs could be particularly intrusive and publication could 
interfere with private and personal life in a peculiarly humiliating and damaging way.  The 
court found that there was no public interest in publishing the photographs, and no 
equivalent material had been placed in the public domain21.   However, that the matter is 
not yet settled is clear from other decisions that have been made in relation to the use of 
photographs.  On matters of post publication in Holden v Express Newspapers 22 Eady J 
granted damages after publication of topless photographs taken of Amanda Holden 
while in hotel garden in Tuscany23.  Anna Ford was not so lucky.  She was unable to 
claim damages for the publication of images taken of her whilst on holiday on a beach in 
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Majorca24.  The court upheld the Press Complaints Findings that the beach was a public 
place.
A further question arises in relation to this type of exploitation.   If the law of breach of 
confidence develops into a general right of privacy, will that in turn give rise to a 
recognised right of publicity in the use of an image – as has been the experience in other 
jurisdictions25?  One case which suggests that it might is Douglas v Hello26.  This case 
concerned the photographs taken at the wedding of Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta 
Jones.  All guests and staff at the reception had been asked to sign a confidentiality 
agreement stating that no photographs would be taken.  The purpose in large part was to 
protect the exclusivity of an agreement they had entered into with the magazine OK! to 
publish photographs of the wedding.  In the event Hello! was permitted to publish the 
photographs although the case is proceeding to trial to see if damages should be 
awarded, and if so on what basis.   Much has been said about the case, not least of which 
has been discussion of the basis on which the decision was made.  Sedley L.J. favoured 
an emergent right of privacy as the basis of the claim, whereas the other judges tended 
rather towards an extension of the breach of confidence claim.  What however is clear is 
that the purpose of the action was in essence to preserve the right of Douglas and Zeta 
Jones to exploit their image with whomever they chose.  In the words of Sedley L.J., ‘the 
dominant feature of the case was the fact that the greater part of that privacy had already been traded and 
fell to be protected as a commodity’27. 
Image manipulation
Personality, Property and Privacy
The second area to be covered is that of image manipulation.  Digital photography and 
advanced software packages mean that it is simple to manipulate an image in almost any 
way imaginable.  Such manipulation or ‘Photofakery’ is of course nothing new28.  A 
recent well-known example concerns the manipulation of a photograph of the late Dodi 
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Al Fayed and Diana, Princess of Wales on a boat looking as if they were about to kiss29.  
But to what extent can the subject control such manipulation?  
In the case Irvine v Talk Sport Radio discussed above that photograph had been 
manipulated to make it look as if Mr Irvine was holding a radio rather than the telephone 
that he actually had been. So in endorsement cases – where an image of a person who is 
well known is manipulated to make it appear as if goods or services are being endorsed, 
there will be a remedy.  However, as has already been pointed out, that extends neither to 
dead icons nor to live individuals without the requisite goodwill.  
One case that does not bode well for litigants in the UK is that of Charleston v News Group 
Newspapers30.   In this case a photograph of a man and woman who appeared to be 
engaged in intercourse was used as part of a pornographic computer game.  
Superimposed on the bodies were images of the heads of Harold and Madge Bishop who 
played in the television soap, Neighbours.  The text underneath the pictures made it clear 
that the images had been made as part of a pornographic computer game without the 
consent of the actors.  Madge and Harold sued on the basis that the picture was 
defamatory.  The House of Lords disagreed saying that looking to the article as a whole it 
was clear that images were part of the pornographic game, and that game had been made 
without consent.  The purpose of the text was to castigate the makers of the game.  
There can be few who would not sympathise with the plight of the actors.
However, another development in the UK has a bearing on this matter, and that is the 
enactment of the Data Protection Act 199831.  Under this Act certain obligations are 
placed on those who control and process personal data i.e. information about living 
individuals.  Not only are processors required to follow certain procedures in connection 
with obtaining the data, but they are also to follow certain principles in relation to 
holding and processing the information.  Processing includes manipulation of, for 
example, photographs.  These obligations are increased where the data relates to such 
matters as the racial or ethnic origin of the subject or her physical or mental health. An 
individual has a right to prevent the processing of personal data where it would cause 
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substantial distress,32 may require access to stored data, and may be awarded 
compensation in the event that processing of the data causes distress.  Enforcement is 
generally by way of the Information Commissioners Office:  in other words by way of a 
public body.  Individuals can however sue, and this is what occurred in Campbell v. Mirror 
Group Newspapers Ltd33 where photographs of Naomi Campbell were taken when she was 
leaving a narcotics clinic.  These images were manipulated, one to add the caption
‘Therapy: Naomi outside Meeting’ and the other to add the headline ‘Naomi: I am a drug addict’.   
The court found that the photographs contained personal sensitive information about
Ms Campbell:  although not relevant to the instant case, they disclosed her ethnic origin.  
Importantly, and of relevance, was the information they disclosed in relation to her 
physical health.  The use of the images in the instant case was not excused under the 
exemption for processing for journalistic purposes34 which is in any event, only of 
relevance to pre-publication processing.  Ms Campbell was awarded damages of £350035.  
It is important to note that the Act does not apply to deceased persons – therefore the 
use and manipulation of an image of Marilyn Monroe would not be caught.  However, 
the use of an image of Posh Spice or Me could be.  As a result, this case raises the 
intriguing question as to whether, for certain persons, the right of informational privacy36  
intended by the scheme of the legislation will in effect become a personality right.
One aspect of the legislation that does cause some concern is that the provisions of the 
Act do not apply to processing of personal data for domestic purposes37 which seems to 
be broad.  What therefore if a photograph were taken of Posh Spice or of Me in a 
domestic setting which was then manipulated in a derogatory manner (such as those in 
the Charleston case) and made available over the Internet.  Would either of us have any 
rights?  It would appear that if that processing could be said to fall under the head of 
domestic purposes then, however malicious the intent, there would no remedy under the 
Act38.  It seems very odd that an Act that professes to be concerned with informational 
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privacy and which in turn may  give right to personality rights, would appear to afford no 
redress for a violation of personal dignity.
Should the UK develop personality rights?
The arguments for the development of a fully fledged regime of personality rights seem 
far from clear-cut.  Many commentators in those jurisdictions, such as the US, where 
personality rights have been in existence for a number of years and where there has been 
ample opportunity to consider the theoretical underpinnings of the right39 are sceptical at 
the justifications put forwards.  Indeed recent literature suggests that far from developing 
the right, it should in many cases be restricted particularly in those instances where the 
right of the personality conflicts with the right of an artist who, in the case of 
photographer, takes the photograph40.  Many justifications revolve around the economic 
incentive that is thought to be associated with the grant of personality rights.  Individuals 
will expend effort on increasing social recognition which in turn can be exploited.  
However, quite apart from the fact that such arguments beg the question as to whether 
fame in itself is a value that should be encouraged, such renown is generally a by-product 
of another trait, such as being a model or an actress, in terms of which that individual is 
already adequately compensated.  Others argue that granting personality rights will lead 
to an efficient allocation of resources.  If personality rights are absent, then over use of 
an image will occur resulting in a fall of the marginal value to zero.  However, that is not 
a sufficient justification for supporting artificial scarcity which may in turn lead to 
consumer exploitation and rent seeking.  Indeed, and perversely the value may increase if 
‘everybody has one41’.  
Other justifications lean rather towards theories of natural rights, and to the right to 
control the fruits of labour.  On the latter point, it is most often not the individual who 
has laboured long over the creation of an image as distinct from the underlying 
profession of the individual.  Rather it is the collective input from industrial concerns 
and indeed the adulation of fans that has created the value attached to the image.  It is 
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also noteworthy that in the early stages of a career a would-be celebrity is often only too 
pleased to obtain as much coverage as possible.
On natural rights some argue that an individual should have a natural right to control an 
image42.  It is ironic that if one considers the cases outlined above, most sympathy might 
attach to the individual in those circumstances where there is no redress and which may 
cause some distress to the reputation or honour of the individual:  areas in which one 
may argue that an individual should have a natural right to control exploitation.  Thus, 
for instance, an individual with no goodwill would not be able to make out a case of false 
endorsement; neither would there be redress for an individual where a photograph was 
taken by another, digitally manipulated and disseminated over the Internet for domestic 
purposes.  These non-commercial uses are termed by some dignitary aspects of 
personality43 find justification in the general right to be let alone.  But how far this 
justification might extend is far from clear.  Would it also encompass the photograph of 
Phan Thi Kim Phuc taken in 1972?44
In terms of the current UK provisions, the outlook for Marilyn Monroe, Posh Spice and 
Me is mixed.  Beyond ownership of the copyright in the image and the moral rights of 
the photographer (where recognised) few rights discussed above subsist for the estate of 
Marilyn Monroe.  The same cannot be said for Posh Spice.  Using her image without 
permission to endorse products, or in a way that might raise questions over 
informational privacy, or even where her interests in maintaining a private home and 
family life outweigh interests of freedom of expression, then she may have a remedy.  My 
rights are more limited notably in the commercial sphere.  Should therefore a move 
towards fully fledged personality rights be supported in the UK?  Is it better to have a 
system which recognises personality rights which are then limited in response to certain 
situations, as in the US, or is it preferable to have no general personality rights but 
sufficient flexibility in the law (in most but not all cases) to respond to clear instances of 
abuse and in consequence be able to afford protection where it is felt most needed?
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For this writer, in the commercial arena, the second option is infinitely preferable.  It is 
certainly the case that there are lacunae in the law which should be remedied, particularly 
in those instances where dignitary aspects of personality are implicated.  However, 
granting a general right of personality could easily lead to abuse by those seeking to 
exercise the right in areas where the right does not, and indeed should not extend.  The 
pressure exerted on the smaller, vulnerable business and on those artists legitimately 
seeking to ply their trade could ultimately do more to stifle than to encourage innovation.  
Much better for the small trader to be (reasonably) secure in the knowledge that 
personality rights are not protected and place the burden of proof on those arguing that 
they do, than to have the rights exist, but to be uncertain as to their extent and thus have 
the burden of proving that a particular use does not fall within the protected right.  
Suffice it to say that the development of technology in the realm of photographs has 
given rise to complicated questions concerning the right that the subject of that image 
should have to control subsequent use.  Competing interests of artist and subject, 
considerations of public and private, questions over commercial and non-commercial use 
and clashes between control and freedom of expression have all proved relevant in the 
quest to make some sense of the developments.  There is, however, a long way to go.
Public versus private
A word must be said on the public/private distinction that permeates much of the 
discussion in relation to commercial control over images but more particularly in relation 
to matters of freedom of expression.  For instance, if an image is shot in a private setting, 
then the subject would seem to have a greater say in the disposition of that image than 
would be the case if the photograph had been taken in public.  The publication of a 
photograph that discloses private information is more likely to be enjoined than one that 
does not.  In this, different considerations also arise over whether a person is a public or 
a private figure:  public figures being accorded generally less protection than others.  
Questions over what is and what is not in the ‘public interest’ are also raised.  Judicial 
views on what constitutes the public interest range from matters which ‘right thinking 
people’ regard as dangerous or irresponsible45 to matters in which the public are 
interested46.  The public private divide also affects the type of regulation in this area.  
                                                
45 Hoffmann L.J. in R. v. Central Independent Television Plc  [1994] Fam. 192 at 201- 204,
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Personality rights generally considered as private rights now appear to be affected by 
public regulation by virtue of the Data Protection Act 1998.  
The purpose of highlighting this debate is to illustrate the extent to which these 
considerations affect this area of the law, and to question the extent to which they 
contribute to the development of coherent principles in this area.  Regulation apart, the 
dividing line between the paradigms is not easy to state with any precision.  On 
regulation it must be questionable as to whether what is essentially a private right should 
be affected by public enforcement.  But if the distinctions are to be discarded, then some 
other means must be found to distinguish what might be a legitimate claim for control 
over an image from one which seeks to exert control in an area to which the law does 
not extend.  The question then is what should that mechanism be?
